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Abstract
Standard international economic theory suggests that people should embrace eco-
nomic integration because it promises large gains. But recent events such as Brexit
indicate a desire for economic disintegration. Here we report results of an exper-
iment, based on a strategic analytical framework, of how size and distribution of
potential gains from integration influence outcomes and individuals’ inclination to
embrace integration. We find that cross-country inequality in potential gains acts
as a friction to realize those gains. This suggests that to better understand re-
cent phenomena, international economic theory should account for distributional
considerations and behavioral aspects it currently ignores.
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1 Introduction
International integration of markets promises large economic gains as resources
can be allocated more efficiently throughout the world economy. Yet, after
decades of increasing economic integration, there are signs of a desire to scale
it back. The backlash in the support of regional and multilateral trade agree-
ments is one indication. The choice of a majority of the British people in 2016
to exit the European Union is another. The question is why: what pushes in-
dividuals to limit or to scale back economic integration given that it is costly?1
Here, we use an experiment to study a possible contributing factor: the size
and distribution of potential economic benefits. The experimental methodol-
ogy is helpful because it allows us to establish causality while minimizing
possible confounding factors—political, social and cultural, for instance. The
starting point in our design is that economic integration expands both size
and heterogeneity of the trading group. This is potentially beneficial because
it raises prospective payoffs for everyone. But, it also induces frictions—trust
and enforcement problems that may encourage short-sighted conduct and dis-
courage cooperation (Rodrik, 2000).2 In this setting, size and distribution of
prospective benefits may influence choices for two reasons.
First, laboratory evidence from two-player cooperation tasks reveals that
opportunistic behavior is elastic to the size of economic incentives (Dal Bo´ and
Fre´chette, 2018). It is an open question if this result extends to large groups
of strangers, such as traders in a global market. This is an important angle
to explore because it has been argued that traditional analysis significantly
1Brexit may cost up to 10 percent of UK per capita GDP (Sampson, 2017); Chakraborty et.
al. (2017) estimate the cost of financial disintegration in Europe at half percent of GDP.
2Rodrik (2000) asserts that individuals must be willing—and not only able—to cooperate
with each other but face additional frictions as compared to exchange within borders, due
to different cultural, legal and political institutions.
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underestimates the size of the possible gains from integration (Desmet et al.,
forth.; Ossa, 2015); if economic incentives affect conduct, then this underesti-
mation might affect outcomes and the support for integration.
Second, even though countries tend to gain from integration, these benefits
may be unevenly distributed or simply perceived to be so, due to cultural or
political considerations. This sort of inequality of opportunity across countries
is an unexplored angle in current theories in international economics. Studying
it is meaningful because of mounting evidence that economic inequality dis-
torts decision-making by inducing short-sighted conduct (Haushofer and Fehr,
2014), and hinders coordination on efficient norms (Camera et al., forth.).
The experiment consists of a cooperation task involving many rounds of
play. Twenty-four participants are randomly assigned to one of three types
(countries), each defined by a specific cooperation payoff, and then are thrust
into two economic scenarios. In the “autarky” scenario, participants have a
fixed counterpart of their same type; here, economies are small, homogeneous
and with minimal trust and enforcement frictions. In the “economic integra-
tion” scenario, participants get a boost in their cooperation payoff but now find
themselves in a 12-person group with an equal mix of types, where counter-
parts are anonymous and change at random in each round. Now, economies are
large, heterogeneous, with more frictions and—importantly—entail inequality
of opportunity since cooperation payoffs vary from type to type.
In each scenario, actual payoffs are endogenous, thus may fall short of
potential depending on counterparts’ behavior. After participants experience
each kind of scenario, we form a single 24-person group and ask participants
if they wish to leave it for autarky, or scale its size down to 16 by forcing one
type into autarky. The majority preference determines the configuration of
this last economy. Between-subjects treatments manipulate the distribution
3
and size—relative and absolute—of the prospective gains from integration so
that in one case integration ensures equal opportunity, while in another it
pushes prospective payoffs further apart. We employ the theory of repeated
games to identify a self-enforcing norm of conduct that supports efficiency,
and to derive hypotheses which we then test using the data collected.
We report four main results. First, participants struggled to capture the
benefits made possible by integration because trust and enforcement problems
prevented cooperation on a wide scale. Second, this finding is robust to the
size of prospective payoffs; cooperation did not improve when we boosted the
potential gains from integration by almost 70%. As a result, integration cre-
ated winners and losers, within and across player types. Third, inequality
of opportunity acted as an obstacle to realizing the gains from integration;
cooperation and welfare declined when prospective payoffs were unequal as
compared to when they were not. Fourth, participants’ attitudes toward eco-
nomic integration were elastic to inequality of economic opportunity: all else
equal, the support for integration sharply declined when it exhibited inequity
in the distribution of potential gains across types.
These results suggest that to better understand recent phenomena, in-
ternational economic theory should account for cross-country distributional
considerations it currently ignores. The experiment also corroborates the no-
tion that economic integration may produce outcomes that diverge from those
predicted by standard models because frictions limit individuals’ ability to re-
alize the gains from trade—an angle of inquiry that is gaining traction in the
international literature (Antra`s and Costinot, 2010).
The study develops as follows. Section 2 discusses related experiments,
and Section 3 the design. Theoretical predictions and testable hypotheses are
in Section 4, results in Sections 5, and policy considerations in Section 6.
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2 Related experimental literature
There is abundant laboratory evidence suggesting that when the group size
varies exogenously, larger groups attain less efficient outcomes than smaller
groups, both in pure coordination games (Van Huyck et al., 1990; Weber,
2006), and in social dilemmas where coordination problems are compounded
by opportunistic motivations (Camera et al., 2013; Isaac and Walker, 1988).
Our study replicates these baseline results by initially confronting subjects
with small and large groups, before endogenizing group size.
The literature on endogenous group size focuses on the impact of group
entry or exit rules on the choice of group size, in social dilemmas. A main
finding is that cooperators will readily aggregate into large groups of like-
minded individuals, as long as institutions exist that allow positive assortative
matching (or self-selection) by facilitating the identification and isolation of
free riders (Ahn et al., 2009; Cinyabuguma et al., 2005; Croson et al., 2015;
Gu¨th et al., 2007; Maier-Rigaud et. al., 2010). Our study differs from these
earlier designs in three dimensions. First, the underlying task is not the usual
VCM game with fixed partners, but a cognitively simpler decision problem
involving counterparts who are strangers. Second, given our focus on interna-
tional integration, the group size is determined by a collective decision process
that aggregates the preferences of all participants while preventing ostracism
of single individuals, self-isolation, and self-selection. Third, many outcomes,
including the efficient one, are consistent with equilibrium, which is unlike
earlier social dilemma designs where theory invariably predicts inefficient play,
and more similar to the coalition-formation study in Nash et al. (2012).
To implement these features we use the frictional trading game developed
in Camera et al. (2013), and build on the design in Bigoni et al. (2019), where
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players are homogeneous, identically benefit from cooperation in any group
size (i.e., equal opportunity), and large groups offer a prospective surplus
gain of 50% to everyone. A main finding is that individuals prefer small
to large groups, and they are unable to realize most of the potential gains,
leaving open the question of whether the choice to form large groups, and
their economic performance, depends on the size and distribution of potential
gains. The present study provides answers by, first, exploring much wider
surplus gains and, second, by studying performance and choices under uneven
distributions of those gains. A second important open question concerns the
impact of inequality of opportunity – an aspect that is largely unexplored
in the literature on cooperation in supergames, and group formation. We
contribute to this line of research by studying the effect of spreading apart
players’ benefits from cooperation on group performance and group choice.
Finally, our study contributes to expand the use of experimental meth-
ods to the field of international economics, following in the footsteps of the
pioneering market experiment in Noussair et al. (1995) that tested the com-
petitive trade model in the lab, and the social dilemma experiment in Barrett
and Dannenberg (2012) about the difficulties of international collective action
in addressing climate change problems.
3 Experimental design
The design captures the idea that economic integration expands the efficiency
frontier relative to domestic trade, but also weakens the contractual environ-
ment, creating trust and enforcement problems. Individuals must coordinate
on new norms of conduct, and must rely to a greater extent on self-enforcing
rules, which magnifies the incentives for opportunistic conduct (Rodrik, 2000).
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To do so we adopt the trading game developed in Camera and Casari (2014),
where trust and enforcement problems create temptations for short-sighted
conduct, and endogenize the group size building on Bigoni et al. (2019). Be-
low we describe the Baseline treatment.
A round of play. Twenty-four participants are randomly assigned to one of
three types i = 1, 2, 3 for the entire session, 8 per type.3 Think of a type as a
country. In each round half of the players are consumers and half producers,
and every producer meets a consumer. In each pair, interaction takes the form
of a “helping game” where only the producer makes a choice; see Table 1.
Table 1: Payoffs in a Producer-Consumer Pair.
Producer’s choice
Defect Cooperate
Consumer (type i): 3 9 + 2i+ g
Producer (any type): 6 0
The game is interpreted as a situation where a producer and a consumer
can engage in a transaction. It is up to the producer whether to pursue this
possibility (cooperate) or not (defect). If the producer does not pursue it, then
she obtains 6 points while the consumer earns 3 points (1 point= USD 0.18).
Instead, if the producer chooses to trade, then she has an immediate cost
implying that she earns nothing while the consumer of type i earns 9 + 2i+ g
points where g ≥ 0. Hence, cooperation payoffs increase in i and we say that
type 1 is “disadvantaged” while type 3 is “advantaged” relative to the “middle”
type 2. Given the structure of this one-shot interaction, for a producer to be
3In the experiment types 1,2 and 3 correspond to the colors green, red, and blue.
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willing to invest in cooperation, there must be some prospect of future trade
opportunities, which is next discussed.
A supergame: A sequence of rounds defines a supergame, which is of un-
certain duration. Participants know they will play 18 rounds at which point,
at the end of each round, a random device determines whether or not a new
round will be played, with probability β = 0.75. This ensures a minimal com-
mon experience across sessions. Consumer and producer roles are randomly
assigned in round 1, and deterministically alternate thereafter.
Counterparts in the supergame depend on the kind of economy: fixed pairs
or mixed groups. In a fixed pairs economy, players have a fixed partner of
their same type. Here, the economy is homogeneous, small (size 2), and there
is perfect monitoring of actions since the counterpart is stable. Instead, at
the start of a mixed groups economy, players are randomly assigned to 12-
player groups with an equal mix of types, and the computer randomly forms
six consumer-producer pairs at the start of each round (uniform probability).
Here, the economy is heterogeneous, large (size 12), and players are “strangers”
who can neither establish a reputation nor identify counterparts or monitor
their past actions as counterparts are unstable. The counterpart’s type is also
hidden from producers (but not from consumers). To promote coordination,
in each round players are informed if the outcome in their pair was the same
as in all other pairs of their mixed group.
The economy’s layout is payoff-relevant: we set g = 0 in fixed pairs and
g = a = 3 in mixed groups. A mixed group is our way to model economic
integration: relative to fixed pairs (autarky) cooperation payoffs are larger
for everyone—with a capturing the potential benefit of integration—but ad-
ditional frictions emerge due to larger group size, unstable and heterogenous
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counterparts, and poor monitoring of past conduct. Importantly, economic
integration entails inequality of (economic) opportunity because of the gap in
cooperation payoffs within the mixed group.
A session. Each session includes five supergames, starting and ending simul-
taneously for every player. The economy’s layout, fixed or mixed, is exogenous
in supergames 1-4 – to give players a common experience with the two kinds
of economies – and endogenous in supergame 5. Participants are informed
that supergames 1-2 have fixed pairs, and supergames 3-4 have mixed groups;
we also study the reverse order “mixed-to-fixed.” Matching across supergames
is pre-arranged to minimize contagion effects: players are informed that they
cannot be matched to counterparts from previous supergames except in the
last supergame if there is a mixed group.
Before supergame 5 starts, players are provisionally assigned to a mixed
group with all 24 participants. Then, they must privately express a preference
for either (i) staying in the mixed group; (ii) scaling back its size to 16 by
excluding one type from it; or (iii) leaving the group for a fixed pair. After
this choice, the computer randomly selects one type with equal probability;
the majority choice among these 8 players determines the group configuration
in supergame 5. Two outcomes are possible: (i) there is a mixed group of 24
players or, (ii) there is a mixed group of 16 players (two types) and 4 fixed
pairs (of the type excluded or that left).4
The group selection procedure is simple to understand and gives equal
weight (ex-ante) to the opinion of each individual and type. A player choosing
4The instructions inform participants that they will have an opportunity to alter size and
composition of their interaction set in supergame 5, without providing specific details until
the end of supergame 4. Doing so minimizes the chance that behavior in the initial four
supergames is affected by the intent to avoid a future possible exclusion.
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“leave,” intends to give up potential gains to ensure reciprocal interaction with
a stable partner. If “exclude” prevails, this scales back the group size from 24 to
16 (neither of which was experienced before) without altering potential payoffs
or monitoring structure in the mixed group, while lowering potential payoffs
among the excluded. Hence, all else equal, “stay” is the socially efficient choice
but it is (weakly) dominated by “exclude” because it creates no costs to those
selecting it while offering two benefits: less strategic uncertainty (less players to
coordinate with) a chance to mitigate free-riding, or punish past free-riding, by
excluding the least cooperative type. Hence, an increased preference for “stay”
relative to “exclude” signals greater trust and cohesion among participants.
Treatments. There are four treatments; see Table 2. In Baseline, poten-
tial gains from integration are equitably distributed, a = 3 for everyone, so
integration does not remove the 4-point payoff gap between advantaged and
disadvantaged. Two main treatments manipulate this payoff gap through a
mean-preserving spread of the Baseline integration benefit a.
Table 2: Benefit of Integration and Inequality of Opportunity.
Player type i = 1, 2, 3
Treatments a 9 + 2i+ a Payoff Gap
Baseline 3 3 3 14 16 18 4
No-Gap 5 3 1 16 16 16 0
Wide-Gap 1 3 5 12 16 20 8
High 5 5 5 16 18 20 4
Notes: Consumers’ integration benefit a and cooperation payoffs in mixed groups, ordered
left to right by type i = 1, 2, 3. Last column: cooperation payoff difference for consumer of
type 3 and 1. Cooperation payoffs in fixed pairs are 9 + 2i points in all treatments.
No-Gap redistributes potential gains from integration top-to-bottom, a =
5, 3, 1 for type i = 1, 2, 3, so integration entails equal opportunity as cooper-
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ation payoffs are 16 points for every consumer. Instead, Wide-Gap introduces
inequity in the distribution of potential gains from integration, a = 1, 3, 5, so
integration entails more severe inequality of opportunity as the advantaged-
disadvantaged payoff gap doubles to 8 points. In a supplementary High treat-
ment, we raise a from 3 to 5 points for everyone, so we have a generalized
improvement in economic prospects that does not affect the baseline payoff
gap. For the experimental procedures see Appendix A.1.
4 Theoretical benchmark and hypotheses
In this setup many outcomes are possible. We start by explaining how many
points a player can earn in a supergame and then discuss the efficient outcome.
Let profit denote the points earned ex-post by a player in the average round
of a supergame. For a player of type i = 1, 2, 3, profits range between 1.5 and
7.5 + i + a/2 points. Indeed, each person alternates between consumer and
producer roles, so the profit function is (approximately) the average payoff in
two consecutive rounds; using Table 1, we define it as
pi(c, C) = 12 [3 + (1− c)6 + C (6 + 2i+ a1mixed)] .
Profits depend on the subject’s cooperation rate c ∈ [0, 1], i.e., the relative
frequency of cooperation as a producer, the cooperation rate C of the average
opponent, and the economy’s layout (the indicator function 1mixed = 1 in a
mixed group and 0 otherwise). Defection gives 6 points to a producer and 3 to
a consumer, which explains the term 3 + (1− c)6. Consumers earn additional
6 + 2i points if the counterpart cooperates, an amount that jumps by a points
in a mixed group. This gives us the term C (6 + 2i+ a1mixed).
Fig. 1 traces iso-profit lines in a mixed group, and shows that subjects’
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choices determine if integration improves welfare, or not. Define two reference
outcomes that entail symmetric and time-invariant choices: Full Cooperation
(c = C = 1, the efficient outcome), and Full Defection (c = C = 0).
Figure 1: Iso-profit Lines for Type i Player in a Mixed Group.
C
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Subject’s cooperation c
A
0
1
Highest profit = 7.5 + i+ a/2
(free rider)
Full C
Lowest profit = 1.5
(altruist)
1
4.5 = Full D profit
4.5 + i
4.5 + i+ a/2
Notes: Profit = payoff in the average round. Full defection gives 4.5 points. Full coopera-
tion gives 4.5 + i points in fixed pairs and 4.5 + i+ a/2 in mixed groups. The lowest profit
occurs if the subject always cooperates (c = 1) and every counterpart defects (C = 0). The
highest profit occurs in mixed groups if the subject always defects and every counterpart
cooperates (c = 0, C = 1). Point A corresponds to the cooperation rate c = C ∈ (0, 1) that
is needed to generate the profit under full cooperation in a fixed pair.
Suppose players act symmetrically. Full defection (axes origin) grants iden-
tical profits of (6+3)/2=4.5 points in any economy. As cooperation improves
we move along the 450 line and profits in mixed groups grow proportionately,
reaching a maximum of 4.5+ i+a/2 (top-right corner) depending on the type;
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the average full cooperation profit is 6.5 points in fixed pairs and 8 points in
mixed groups of the main treatments. Point A, which identifies full coopera-
tion profits in fixed pairs (4.5 + i points), shows that mixed groups can attain
larger profits than fixed pairs even with partial cooperation.
If cooperation is asymmetric, then profits have a wider range. Left of
the 450 line we have profits of free riders. These players cooperate less than
the average counterpart, thus raising their own earnings by disproportionately
lowering others’. Right of the 450 line we have profits of altruists. Asymme-
tries in cooperation can generate profit heterogeneity within and across types
and, in particular, profits that are larger in fixed pairs than mixed groups for
some players but not others, as if economic integration created “winners” and
“losers.” Extreme cooperation asymmetries can push a free-rider’s profit above
the full cooperation level, and an altruist’s profit below the full defection level;
see the shaded areas in the figure. None of these outcomes are efficient.
Partial cooperation generates economic inefficiency. To calculate an ef-
ficiency measure, we first determine the realized surplus by subtracting the
full defection profit from the average realized profit in the economy.5 Real-
ized efficiency is the ratio of realized surplus to its theoretical maximum, and
is directly proportional to the average cooperation rate in the economy. It
goes from 0% (full defection), to an average of 57% in fixed pairs (depend-
ing on the type), to 100% in mixed groups. Hence, economic integration can
substantially improve welfare of each individual. Therefore, if mixed groups
support efficient play, then choosing a mixed group with all 24-players is the
Pareto-efficient choice. But is efficient play part of an equilibrium?
Proposition 1. Full cooperation is a sequential equilibrium in each economy,
and in every treatment.
5The maximum surplus in fixed pairs varies between 1 and 3 points in fixed pairs (5.5-4.5
and 7.5-4.5), and it is 3.5 points (8-4.5) in mixed groups of the main treatments.
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Proof. See Appendix A
To prove the proposition we demonstrate the existence of a strategy that
supports efficient play in fixed pairs as well as in mixed groups of any size. The
proof is a version of Kandori (1992, Proposition 1), extended to the case of het-
erogeneous players. Consider the following trigger strategy: the player always
cooperates as a producer, but will forever defect as soon as some producer
defects. Since at the end of each round everyone sees if outcomes differed
across meetings, defecting in cooperative equilibrium triggers an immediate
and permanent collective sanction: full defection. Full defection is always an
equilibrium in the continuation game since defection is always a best response
to everyone else defecting. Hence, it is incentive-compatible for a player to
follow this collective sanction. In the proof of Proposition 1 we derive a con-
dition ensuring that the player has no incentive to deviate in equilibrium, i.e.,
the continuation probability β ≥ β∗ := 6/(6 + 2i + a1mixed). The threshold
value β∗ varies across player types and economy’s layout (see Table 3).
Table 3: Threshold continuation probability β∗.
Fixed Pair Mixed Group
Treatment i =1 2 3 i =1 2 3
Baseline .75 .60 .50 .55 .46 .40
No-Gap .75 .60 .50 .46 .46 .46
Wide-Gap .75 .60 .50 .67 .46 .35
High .75 .60 .50 .46 .40 .35
If the cooperative strategy is a best response for disadvantaged players (who
have the least incentive to cooperate), then this is so for everyone else. In fixed
pairs β∗ = 0.75 for the disadvantaged, a threshold that drops in mixed groups
since cooperation payoffs increase for all. As the continuation probability is
0.75, full cooperation is part of a sequential equilibrium in all economies.
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Corollary 1. In all treatments, economic incentives to cooperate exist for all
players and are the largest in mixed groups. The treatment manipulations do
not alter the equilibrium set.
It should be clear that there are many symmetric equilibria, including full
defection and partial cooperation, but full cooperation is the Pareto-dominant
one. If Pareto efficiency is the empirically relevant equilibrium selection cri-
terion, then payoff-maximizing players should coordinate on full cooperation,
and prefer economic integration (the 24-player group) over other group con-
figurations. However, it is unclear what equilibrium (if any) players will select
in the experiment because the theory does not generate a specific prediction
regarding cooperation rates and group choices. Based on the arguments de-
veloped above, we thus put forward three hypotheses:
H 1. Cooperation is unaffected by the size of prospective earnings.
H 2. Cooperation is unaffected by inequality in prospective earnings.
H 3. The decision to “integrate” is unaffected by treatments.
On the other hand, experiments reveal that strangers struggle to cooperate,
even if they are completely homogeneous (Camera et al., 2013), while, broadly
speaking, cooperation tends to improve when the economic incentives become
more favorable (Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette, 2018). An increasing body of evidence
also suggests that income distribution fundamentally influences human behav-
ior (Cappelen et al., 2014); in particular, economic inequality hinders coordi-
nation on efficient play in finitely and indefinitely repeated social dilemmas
(Camera et al., forth.; Tavoni et al., 2011), and fosters short-sighted conduct
both in the lab and in the field (Haushofer and Fehr, 2014). These consid-
erations suggest two alternative behavioral hypotheses: (i) larger prospective
payoffs should foster cooperation, and (ii) inequality of opportunity should
magnify opportunistic conduct and reduce cooperation.
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5 Results
Here we discuss outcomes in supergames 1-4 and then show how they affected
group choices, starting with the Baseline treatment.
5.1 The baseline case
In this treatment there is a 4-points gap between prospective payoffs of advan-
taged and disadvantaged consumers, and the potential gains from economic
integration are identical across types, a = 3.
Result 1. Mixed groups cooperated less than fixed pairs.
Fig. 2 and non-parametric tests provide evidence. In Fig. 2 the unit of
observation is one subject in a supergame (N=192 per supergame 1-4).
Figure 2: Cooperation in the Baseline treatment
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Notes: One obs.=one subject in a supergame 1-4, rounds 1-18 (N = 384 per economy,
fixed pairs and mixed groups). Cooperation: average relative frequency of cooperation in
a supergame. Full Cooperation: relative frequency of full cooperation in a supergame (=1
if the subject as a producer cooperated in every round, 0 otherwise). Efficiency: average
realized efficiency in the supergame. The whiskers identify the standard error of the mean.
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The left panel reports the average cooperation rate, the right panel the rel-
ative frequency of full cooperation, for fixed pairs and mixed groups.6 Mixed
groups are the least cooperative: the average cooperation rate is 0.79 in fixed
pairs, and 0.41 in mixed groups (0.61 and 0.14, respectively, for full cooper-
ation). These differences are statistically significant when we use a session
as the independent unit of observation (two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney
ranksum tests with exact statistics where, p-values < 0.001, N1=N2=8). Re-
sult 1 confirms the robustness of the findings in Bigoni et al. (2019); Camera
et al. (2013), where players are homogeneous.
Fig. 2 also reveals that experience with the game matters. Subjects either
experienced two consecutive supergames of economies as fixed pairs followed
by economies as mixed groups (4 sessions), or the reverse ordering (4 sessions).
For the group size, cooperation is greater in supergames 3-4 as compared to
1-2 according to non-parametric tests7 and a GLM regression (Table B1, in
Appendix B.1.) that also supports an additional result.
Result 2. Cooperation was stable in fixed pairs, but unstable in mixed groups.
Fig. 3 reports the mean cooperation rate by round of play (all rounds
in supergames 1-4, all subjects). In fixed pairs, cooperation is stable until
round 18, when the random termination process starts. Instead, in mixed
groups cooperation declines; see Table B1, in Appendix B.1 for additional
details. Taken together, results 1-2 reveal that participants faced additional
6Let ct = 1 denote a cooperative action by a player who is a producer in period t (0, if
defection). Let tp be the number of periods in which this player was a producer in the
supergame. The cooperation rate for this player is
∑tp
t=1 ct/tp ∈ [0, 1]. If we let pit denote
the payoff to a player in round t and T be the total number of periods of the supergame,
then the profit realized by the player in the average period of the supergame is
∑T
t=1 pit/T .
Since supergames’ duration varies (between 18 and 36 rounds, expected 21 rounds, with
s.d. 3.45), we focus on the first 18 rounds (approximately 86% of all observations).
7Two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney ranksum tests; cooperation p-values=0.029, 0.086 and
full cooperation p-values=0.029, 0.114 for fixed pairs and mixed groups, N1=N2=4).
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frictions in realizing the possible gains from trading in an integrated economy
as opposed to autarky. These frictions reduced the willingness to cooperate
and, hence, did not allow society to benefit from economic integration.
Figure 3: Cooperation Dynamics in the Baseline treatment
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Notes: One obs.=average subject in a round of supergames 1-4, all rounds. Cooperation:
relative frequency of cooperation averaged across all subjects in all supergames. The shaded
areas identify the standard error of the mean.
Result 3. Mixed groups did not attain greater efficiency than fixed pairs.
Fig. 2 and Table 4 provide evidence. Realized efficiency is proportional to
average profits in an economy, as defined in Section 4. Full defection profits
are 4.5 points (0% efficiency), while full cooperation profits are on average
6.5 points in fixed pairs (57% efficiency) and 8 points in mixed groups (100%
efficiency). In Baseline, profits are statistically similar according to a linear
regression (6 points in fixed pairs and 5.9 in mixed groups).8 We regress
8This is confirmed if we use a session as the independent unit of observation (two-sided
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average profits in a supergame on a Mixed Group dummy that is one for a
mixed group (0, for a fixed pair, the base of the regression). We also add an
Experienced dummy taking value 1 in supergames 3-4 (0, otherwise, the base
of the regression), which we interact with the Mixed Group dummy in order
to control for order effects. Standard controls are included.
Table 4: Realized Profits in Partnerships vs. Mixed groups in Baseline.
Dep. var.: realized profit Coeff. S.E.
Mixed Group -0.090 (0.076)
Experienced 0.610*** (0.135)
Mixed Groups × Experienced -0.036 (0.133)
Controls Yes
Constant 6.340*** (1.235)
N 32
R2 0.874
adj R2 0.822
Notes: Linear regression on realized profit, with standard errors (S.E.) robust for clustering
at the session level. One obs.= one supergame in a session, supergames 1-4, rounds 1-18.
Mixed Group=1 if it was mixed groups (0, otherwise), Experienced=1 if the supergame is
3 or 4 (0, otherwise). Controls include duration of the current and previous supergame,
self-reported sex, and three measures of understanding of instructions (response time and
wrong answers in the quiz, and self-reported instruction clarity in the final survey). Symbols
∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
We can reject the hypothesis that, when subjects are inexperienced (su-
pergames 1-2) mixed groups attained greater efficiency than fixed pairs. The
Mixed Group coefficient is negative, close to zero and insignificant. We can
similarly reject this hypothesis for experienced subjects (supergames 3-4); the
sum of the coefficients Mixed Group+Mixed Group × Experienced is also neg-
ative and statistically close to zero (F-test, p-value=0.437). The results do
not change if we include all rounds in a supergame.
Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney ranksum tests with exact statistics, p-value=0.574, N1=N2=8).
19
In sum, economic integration failed to increase average payoffs due to a
general decline in cooperation. The natural questions are whether conduct in
mixed groups differed across player types and whether integration was eco-
nomically beneficial for some but not others.
Result 4. The advantaged tended to cooperate more than the disadvantaged.
Tables 5-Table 6 provide support. Table 5 reports average cooperation
rates by type, kind of economy, and order of play. The advantaged cooperated
more than others in sessions that started with mixed groups (panel b) but this
behavior is not systematic because it is not observed when sessions started with
fixed pairs (panel a). We establish the significance of this observation through
GLM regressions. We regress average cooperation rate in a supergame on
player type dummies (type 2 is the base of the regression). Standard controls
are included. Marginal effects are in Table 6.
Table 5: Cooperation by Player Type and Order of Play.
(a) Fixed-to-Mixed (b) Mixed-to-Fixed
Disadv. Middle Adv. Disadv. Middle Adv.
Fixed Pair 0.81 0.66 0.65 0.80 0.84 0.97
Mixed Group 0.54 0.55 0.51 0.22 0.26 0.37
Notes: One obs.=one subject in a supergame 1-4, Baseline treatment, rounds 1-18.
Considering all data pooled together (col. 1 and 4), we find no significant
difference in cooperation across types (Wald tests on coefficients on type dum-
mies for columns 1 and 3, p-values=0.552,0.346, respectively). Once we sep-
arate the data based on the order of play, we only find differences in sessions
starting with mixed groups, where the advantaged cooperated significantly
more than the disadvantaged (Wald tests, p-values < 0.001, col. 3 and 6).
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Hence, H1 can be rejected only for sessions that started with mixed groups.
We now discuss the consequences of these cooperation differentials.
Table 6: Cooperation by Player Type in Baseline–Marginal Effects.
Fixed Pairs Mixed Groups
Dep. var.: All 2-to-12 12-to-2 All 2-to-12 12-to-2
coop. rate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Disad. 0.036 0.061 -0.048 -0.027 -0.010 -0.037
(0.065) (0.063) (0.093) (0.045) (0.079) (0.051)
Adv. 0.074 -0.030 0.138 0.031 -0.059 0.139***
(0.061) (0.044) (0.111) (0.049) (0.092) (0.029)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 192 96 96 96 48 48
Notes: GLM regressions on avg. cooperation rate; standard errors (in parentheses) robust
for clustering at session level. One obs.=one supergame 1-4, Baseline, rounds 1-18. Disad.
=1 one for a type 1 player (0, otherwise); Adv.=1 for a type 3 player (0, otherwise); type 2 is
the base value. Col. 1 and 4: all sessions; Col. 2 and 5: sessions with 2-2-12-12 order; Col.
3 and 6: sessions with reversed order of economies. Controls include duration of current and
previous supergame, self-reported sex, and three measures of understanding of instructions.
Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
Result 5. Economic integration created winners and losers, implying relative
gains for the disadvantaged but relative losses for the advantaged.
Fig. 4 reports the implied gains from integration. Fixing a supergame
n = 1, . . . , 4, we ask: would the average type i player gain or lose points if she
were in a mixed group instead of a fixed pair? Each marker reports the average
difference in realized profits.9 As all consumers could earn 3 extra points in
mixed groups, the potential gain is 1.5 points for every type (dashed line).
Empirically, implied gains are below this value, and inversely related to the
type—negative for the advantaged (squares) and positive for the disadvantaged
(triangles). These differences are statistically significant according to a linear
9Hence, this profit difference is calculated between-subjects, and is not biased by the order
of economies within a session, as a within-subjects measure would be.
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regression (see Table B2 in Appendix B). An interpretation is that economic
integration in the experiment created winners and losers across types.10
Figure 4: Implied Gains from Economic Integration.
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Notes: One obs.=one subject in a supergame 1-4, Baseline treatment, rounds 1-18. Implied
gains: difference in realized profits between mixed groups and fixed pairs, by supergame.
We study how this experience affected subjects’ choice of economic organi-
zation by pooling the two exclusion choices into a single one called “exclude.”
We thus have three possible group choices: “stay” in the 24-player mixed group
(economic integration), scale it back to 16 players, or “leave” it (autarky).
Result 6. “Leave” was the majority choice, while “stay” was the least frequent.
A related observation is that a subject’s experience in supergames 1-4 ex-
plains variation in group choices, while differences in prospective payoffs (i.e.,
the player’s type) do not; see Fig. 5, and Table 7.
10There are also winners and losers within the same type. If we interpret a type as a country,
then this observation would seem consistent with international trade theories. Yet, these
differences within a type are due to unequal cooperation rates, with frequent cooperators
being “losers” and frequent defectors “winners.”
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Fig. 5 reports the distribution of group choices by type. The choice fre-
quency is inversely related to the group size. Fixed pairs are the majority
choice; we cannot reject the hypothesis that the frequency is equal to 50%
(two-sided t-test, p-value=0.584, N=8). We can also reject the hypothesis
that “leave” is as frequent as “exclude,” and “exclude” is as frequent as “stay”
(two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney ranksum test with exact statistics, p-
values=0.046, 0.044, N1=N2=8). This evidence matches that in Bigoni et al.
(2019) where, however, players are homogeneous and cannot exclude others.
Figure 5: Distribution of group choices by player type in Baseline.
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Notes: One obs.= one session of Baseline (N = 8). Relative frequency of choice “leave”,
“exclude” and “stay.” The whiskers identify the mean standard error.
The fact that players prefer “exclude” over “stay” is intriguing because
scaling back the size of the mixed group dissipates potential surplus (while
“stay” is socially optimal) and cannot improve the player’s prospective pay-
offs. However, it can decrease strategic uncertainty and be used as a form
of sanction. Hence, a natural question is what explains group choices and
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whether the advantaged chose differently than the disadvantaged.
Table 7: Group Choices in Baseline–Marginal Effects
Dep. variable= Leave Exclude Stay
group choice (1) (2) (3)
Disadvantaged 0.070 -0.122 0.052
(0.142) (0.133) (0.048)
Advantaged 0.048 -0.057 0.008
(0.090) (0.085) (0.038)
∆ Profit -0.173*** 0.105* 0.068**
(0.061) (0.056) (0.029)
Cooperation Balance -0.017 0.005 0.012
(0.080) (0.072) (0.014)
100% C in Fixed Pairs 0.118 -0.084 -0.034
(0.134) (0.126) (0.028)
100% C in Mixed Groups -0.482*** 0.327*** 0.155
(0.141) (0.110) (0.126)
Mixed-to-Fixed -0.160** -0.027 0.187***
(0.067) (0.085) (0.067)
N 192 192 192
Notes: Multinomial logit regression on preferences for the three group choices. One
obs.=one subject in a session of Baseline. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) ad-
justed for clustering at session level. The regressors ∆ Profit and Cooperation Bias are
standardized, and together with the categorical variables 100% C in Fixed Pairs and 100%
C in Mixed Groups capture the subject’s experience in supergames 1-4. Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗,
and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
A multinomial logit reveals that experience, not prospective gains, explains
observed variation in group choices. We regress a player’s group choice on the
dummies Advantaged and Disadvantaged (type 2 is the base). Four explana-
tory variables capture the subject’s experience in the first four supergames:
the continuous regressor ∆Profit is the (standardized) difference in profits re-
alized in mixed groups vs. fixed pairs; Cooperation Bias is the (standardized)
difference between the player’s cooperation rate in mixed groups and that of
her opponents; the dummy variables 100% C in Fixed Pairs and 100% C in
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Mixed Groups capture the effect of experiencing efficient play. The dummy
Mixed-to-Fixed soaks up the order effect (fixed pairs first, or mixed groups).
Standard controls are included. Table 7 reports marginal effects.
The player type dummies have equal sign, are statistically similar and
indistinguishable from zero (Wald tests). Hence, having different economic
prospects does not per se affect group choices.11 What matters is individ-
ual experience (supergames 1-4). A positive profit differential and experience
of efficient play in a mixed group both significantly lower the probability of
choosing “leave.” However, they do so to different degrees and for different
reasons. A one standard deviation increase in ∆Profit lowers the probability
of “leave” by 17 ppts., raising the probability of “exclude” by 10 and of “stay”
by 7 ppts. This captures the choice of free-riders, who can more easily extract
rents in mixed groups than fixed pairs—where negative reciprocity is possible.
Experiencing efficient play in a mixed group lowers the probability of “leave”
by 49 ppts., while raising that of “exclude” by 33 ppts.; those who met co-
operative strangers, tried to replicate this favorable outcome by choosing a
16-player group to mitigate strategic uncertainty.12 This result is in line with
Bigoni et al. (2019), who show that homogeneous players choose large or small
groups based on their individual cooperation experience in those groups.
To sum up, when economic integration offered equal potential gains to all,
the choice of economic organization was similar across types and primarily
tied to past personal experience—not prospective payoffs. Did reshuffling the
prospective gains from integration alter this result?
11Using a session as an independent observation, we cannot reject the hypothesis that each
group choice is equally frequent for any two player types (two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann Whit-
ney ranksum test with exact statistics, p-values ranging from 0.170 to 0.625, for the nine
different pairwise comparisons, N1=N2=8).
12100% C in Mixed Groups=1 in 8 of 192 obs.; 100% C in Fixed Pairs=1 in 138 of 192 obs.
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5.2 The influence of inequality of opportunity
In No-Gap economic integration no longer implies inequality of opportunity
because prospective gains a are redistributed from the advantaged to the dis-
advantaged. Instead, inequality of opportunity is extreme in Wide-Gap because
the distribution of prospective gains is iniquitous: the advantaged dispropor-
tionately benefit at the expense of the disadvantaged; see Table 2.13
Result 7. Cooperation and profits are lower in Wide-Gap than in No-Gap.
Evidence is in Fig. 6 and Table 8. The left panel in Fig. 6 reports average
cooperation and realized efficiency by group size, pooling supergames 1-4.
Figure 6: Inequality of Opportunity Affects Cooperation
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Notes: One obs.=one subject in a supergame 1-4, rounds 1-18 (N = 384 per type of
economy, fixed pairs and mixed groups). Left panel: overall cooperation rate in mixed groups
and fixed pairs. Right panel: average relative frequency of cooperation in a supergame of
mixed groups, by subject type. See notes to Fig. 2 for additional details.
Inequality of opportunity in mixed groups increases as we move across
treatments, left to right; the mixed-group payoff gap between advantaged and
13Considering each treatment in isolation, we find that outcomes in supergames 1-4 are
broadly consistent with Results 1-4 for Baseline. Evidence is provided in Appendix 7.
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disadvantaged players increases from 0 (No-Gap), to 4 points (Baseline), to 8
points (Wide-Gap); see Table 2. Three observations stand out. Cooperation is
the lowest in Wide-Gap, not only in mixed groups but also in fixed pairs (even
if treatments did not alter any parameter of fixed pairs, but only of mixed
groups). This suggests that the overall structure of the session influenced
the structure of incentives, not just the structure of the specific supergame.
Second, the cooperation decline is nonlinear; we see no drop as we increase
the gap from 0 to 4 points, but a sharp drop when we double the payoff gap
in mixed groups to 8 points. Third, in relative terms, the drop in cooperation
is similar in mixed groups and fixed pairs (about a 14% decline).
GLM regressions reveal a significant cooperation decline for the average
subject. Panel A in Table 8 reports marginal effects. The dependent variable
is the cooperation rate of a subject in supergames 1-4, which we regress on
two treatment dummies (Baseline is the base value) each of which is interacted
with an order dummy and an experience dummy taking value 1 it is the second
supergame with the same economy size. Standard controls are included.
Cooperation increased relative to the baseline case when mixed groups
had no inequality of opportunity (positive coefficient on the No-Gap dummy),
but this is statistically significant only in fixed pairs. Conversely, cooperation
declined relative to the baseline case when we doubled payoff gaps in mixed
groups (negative coefficient on the Wide-Gap dummy). This effect is significant
only in mixed groups. We can reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on
these two dummy variables are similar (Wald tests, p-values=0.037, 0.033 for
fixed pairs and mixed groups, respectively). Hence, we can reject H2.14 The
14If we use a session as the independent unit of observation and two-sided tests, then we
cannot reject the hypothesis that cooperation rates in mixed groups are similar across
treatments (two-sided ranksum tests with exact statistics, p-values between 0.328 and
0.937 for each of the three treatment comparisons, N1=N2=8). The same holds true for
27
cooperation decline that resulted when we doubled payoff gaps in mixed groups
caused a decline in average profits. The natural question is: did all player types
decreased their cooperation, or only some?
Table 8: Inequality of Opportunity and Cooperation–Marginal Effects
Dep. var.: Fixed Pairs Mixed Groups
Coop. rate Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Panel A: All Player Types
No-Gap 0.123*** (0.032) 0.026 (0.070)
Wide-Gap -0.055 (0.083) -0.201* (0.112)
Panel B: Disadvantaged Players
No-Gap 0.004 (0.088) 0.001 (0.065)
Wide-Gap -0.106 (0.085) -0.279*** (0.098)
Panel C: Middle Players
No-Gap 0.127* (0.067) 0.003 (0.100)
Wide-Gap -0.001 (0.118) -0.247* (0.132)
Panel D: Advantaged Players
No-Gap 0.190*** (0.053) 0.047 (0.073)
Wide-Gap -0.083 (0.113) -0.103 (0.132)
Notes: GLM regression on avg. cooperation rate; standard errors (S.E.) robust for cluster-
ing at session level. Data from supergames 1-4 of the three main treatments, rounds 1-18.
One obs.=one subject in a supergame (N=128 per player type, per treatment). No-Gap
and Wide-Gap are treatment dummies (Baseline is the base). The treatment dummies are
interacted with two dummy variables (not reported): an order dummy taking the value 1 if
the session started with mixed groups (0, otherwise), and an experience dummy taking the
value 1 if it is the second supergame with the same economy size (0, otherwise). We also
include standard controls (not reported): duration of the previous supergame, self-reported
sex (average in the economy), and two measures of understanding of instructions (average
response time and average wrong answers in the quiz). Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Marginal effects are computed at
the mean value of regressors of continuous variables.
Result 8. Disadvantaged and middle types reduced cooperation as payoff gaps
widened in mixed groups, while the advantaged did not.
A related observation is that we observe treatment effects in fixed pairs for
fixed pairs (p-values between 0.185 and 0.900). Similar considerations can be made if we
consider full cooperation and realized efficiency.
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Advantaged and Middle players even if we anticipated none, because treat-
ments only manipulated the payoffs gaps in mixed groups.
Evidence is in Fig. 6 and Table 8. The right panel in Fig. 6 reports
average cooperation in mixed groups separately for each player type, pool-
ing supergames 1-4 for each treatment. Moving from No-Gap to Wide-Gap,
generates a marked decline in cooperation only the disadvantaged and middle
players (10 and 7 percentage points, respectively). The regressions in panels
B-D in Table 8 confirm that this decline is statistically significant, while it is
insignificant for advantaged players (the treatment dummies in Panel D, for
mixed groups are statistically similar, Wald test p-value=0.221). Hence, we
can reject H1. What is surprising is that inducing inequality of opportunity
in mixed groups induced a cooperation decline in fixed pairs, for some player
types, even if the payoff matrix in fixed pairs never changed across treatments.
This suggests that inequality of opportunity negatively affected cooperative at-
titudes in the entire session, not just in the specific supergame in which it was
introduced. The next result provides additional support for this view.
Result 9. The frequency of “leave” was unaffected as payoff gaps widened in
mixed groups. By contrast, “exclude” crowded out “stay.”
Fig. 7, statistical tests and the regressions in Table 9 provide support.
The figure reports relative frequencies of group preferences, by treatment. The
choice “leave” is unaffected by treatments; we can neither reject the hypothesis
that it is equal to 50% (two-sided t-test, p-values=0.390, 0.420 for No-Gap
and Wide-Gap), nor that it is similar in pairwise treatment comparisons (two-
sided Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney ranksum test with exact statistics, lowest p-
value=0.775, N1=N2=8).
Second, removing payoff inequality from mixed groups shifts frequency
mass from “exclude” to “stay.” We cannot reject the hypothesis that “leave”
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is more frequent than “stay” (p-values < 0.001 for No-Gap and Wide-Gap,
N1=N2=8). However, while in No-Gap “exclude” is as frequent as “stay”
(p-value=0.589, N1=N2=8), in Wide-Gap it is more frequent than “stay” (p-
value=0.005, N1=N2=8) and as frequent as “leave” (p-value=0.390, N1=N2=8).
Figure 7: Inequality of Opportunity Influenced Group Choices.
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Notes: One obs.= one session (N = 8 per treatment). Relative frequency of choice “leave”,
“exclude” and “stay.” The whiskers identify the mean standard error.
Given the direction of the observed shifts, we can reject the hypothesis that
“exclude” is greater than or equal in Wide-Gap as compared to No-Gap, and can
reject the opposite hypothesis for “stay” (one-sided Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney
ranksum tests with exact statistics, p-value=0.082, 0.053 for “exclude” and
“stay” respectively, N1=N2=8). Overall, this is evidence that a 24-player
group was more frequently selected when mixed groups removed inequality
of opportunity (No-Gap) as compared to when they enhanced it (Wide-Gap).
Hence, we can reject H3.
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Table 9: Group Choices in the Main Treatments–Marginal Effects
Dep. variable= Leave Exclude Stay
group choice (1) (2) (3)
No-Gap -0.017 -0.040 0.057
(0.060) (0.035) (0.059)
Wide-Gap 0.007 0.033 -0.040
(0.061) (0.040) (0.047)
∆ Profit -0.247*** 0.127*** 0.119***
(0.042) (0.023) (0.042)
Cooperation Bias -0.048 0.050* -0.003
(0.039) (0.030) (0.023)
100% C in Fixed Pairs 0.095 -0.016 -0.079**
(0.061) (0.056) (0.037)
100% C in Mixed Groups -0.327*** 0.075 0.252**
(0.110) (0.075) (0.115)
Mixed-to-Fixed -0.146*** 0.029 0.117**
(0.042) (0.037) (0.048)
N 576 576 576
Notes: Multinomial logit regression on preferences for the three group choices. Data for
the main treatments. No-Gap and Wide-Gap are treatment dummies (Baseline is the base).
For other details see notes to Table 7.
We use a multinomial logit regression to find out if this result is confirmed
once we control for variation in subjects’ experience across treatments. To
do so, we adjust the specification of the regression in Table 7, by pooling
the data from all main treatments, omitting the type covariates and instead
adding treatment covariates (Baseline is the base of the regression). Marginal
effects are in Table 9. The regression confirms that once we control for expe-
rience, there is no residual treatment effect on the frequency of “leave;” the
coefficients on the treatment dummies are close to zero, insignificant, ad statis-
tically similar (Wald test, p-value=0.667). Instead, there is a significant effect
on the frequency of “stay,” which increases by about 6 percentage points in
No-Gap relative to Baseline, while it falls by 4 percentage points in Wide-Gap.
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These differences in marginal effects are statistically significant (Wald test,
p-value=0.061). The variation in “stay” is balanced by the opposite variation
in “exclude,” although we cannot reject the hypothesis that treatment coeffi-
cients are similar in this case (Wald test, p-value=0.124). An interpretation is
that the support for economic integration increases when the process is known
to be beneficial and to reduce extant differences in economic inequality across
countries. The converse is true when integration widens economic gaps.
To understand if treatments differentially affect types’s choices, we study
the “stay” choice using a separate logit regression for each type, pooling data
from all main treatments. The treatment coefficients in columns 1 and 3 are
statistically similar (Wald tests), meaning that types 1 and 3 act similarly
across treatments; instead, we do find that type 2 players more frequently
select “exclude” in No-Gap than the other two treatments. Support for this is
Table B7 and Fig. 9 of Appendix B.
Summing up, a majority of players preferred fixed pairs to any other group
configuration. Removing inequality of opportunity from mixed groups did not
change this result—although it improved cohesiveness and trust, as seen from
the shift in preferences from “exclude” to “stay.” The open question is whether
group preferences are elastic to a generalized increase in prospective gains from
integration. To answer this question we study the High treatment, where we
raised a by 67% relative to the baseline setup.
5.3 An increase in potential gains from integration
In High, every consumer can earn 5 more points in mixed groups than fixed
pairs. This boosts the economic incentives for cooperation in mixed groups.
Result 10. Cooperation did not increase in High as compared to Baseline.
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A related observation is that cooperation declined in fixed pairs. Evidence
is provided in Fig. 8 and the GLM regression reported in Table B9.
Figure 8: Effect of an Increase in Prospective Payoffs on Cooperation
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Notes: One obs.=one subject in a supergame 1-4, rounds 1-18 (N = 384 per economy kind,
fixed pairs and mixed groups). See notes to Fig. 2 for additional details.
Using a session as an independent observation, we can reject the hypothe-
sis of identical cooperation in Baseline and in High for fixed pairs, but not for
mixed groups (two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney ranksum test with exact
statistics, p-values=0.061,0.488, N1=N2=8). A GLM regression confirms this
result; see Table B9 in Appendix B. Hence, we cannot reject H1 because coop-
eration did not change in mixed groups. The fact that there was a treatment
effect in fixed pairs is surprising because the structure of payoffs was unaltered
relative to the baseline setup. Though raising a did not improve cooperation
rates, it did raise profits and hence realized efficiency in mixed groups relative
to fixed pairs (see Fig. 8). As a result, integration created mostly winners
(average implied gains are 0.97, 0.77, and -0.11 points for types 1,2,3, respec-
tively), which affected group choices.
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Result 11. “Leave” was less frequently selected in High as compared Baseline,
while the frequency of “stay” and “exclude” each increased.
Evidence comes from Fig. 9 and the multinomial logit regression in Table
10, showing that group choices were affected by the High treatment.
Figure 9: Effect of an Increase in Prospective Payoffs on Group Choices
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Notes: Distribution of choices for “leave” (left), “exclude” and “stay” (right). One obs. =
one session (N=8 per treatment).
Fig. 9 shows that “leave” declined by 16 ppts in High, while “stay” in-
creased by 11 ppts.15 As seen before, the shift in probability mass from “leave”
towards “exclude” and “stay” is primarily influenced by the difference in re-
alized profits in Mixed Groups vs. Fixed pairs. A one-standard deviation
increase in the coefficient on the ∆ Profit regressor reduces the probability to
“leave” by 20 percentage points, while it similarly increases the probabilities
to select “exclude” and “stay” (Wald test, p-value=0.703).
15Using a session as an independent observation, a two-sided test rejects the hypothesis of
identical “leave” choices in Baseline and High, but not “stay” (two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann
Whitney ranksum test with exact statistics, p-values=0.047,0.165, N1=N2=8).
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Table 10: Group Choices in High vs. Baseline–Marginal Effects
Dep. variable= Leave Exclude Stay
group choice (1) (2) (3)
High -0.103 0.048 0.055
(0.071) (0.055) (0.041)
∆ Profit -0.201*** 0.090** 0.111***
(0.044) (0.037) (0.034)
Cooperation Bias -0.037 0.024 0.013
(0.048) (0.041) (0.017)
100% C in Fixed Pairs 0.182*** -0.145** -0.037
(0.066) (0.060) (0.029)
100% C in Mixed Groups -0.333*** 0.242** 0.091
(0.118) (0.100) (0.075)
Mixed-to-Fixed -0.191*** -0.028 0.219***
(0.054) (0.045) (0.046)
N 384 384 384
Notes: Multinomial logit regression on preferences for the three group choices. Data for
Baseline and High. High is a treatment dummy. For other details, see notes to Table 7.
The High dummy offers an estimate of the impact of the 67% increase in
prospective gains from integration, when we control for realized gains. The
probability of choosing “leave” falls by 10 ppts., while “exclude” and “stay”
increase by 5 ppts. each, but none of these coefficients is statistically insignif-
icant. Hence, the increment in prospective gains itself reinforced the effect of
realized gains, but it is of second order importance. Mixed groups became
more attractive because they generated better earnings than in the baseline
setup, not simply because they promised better earnings.
6 Discussion
From the perspective of international economics, phenomena such as Brexit or,
more generally, the backlash in the support of regional and multilateral trade
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agreements present a puzzle. People should embrace economic integration,
because they can economically benefit from it. The traditional explanation is
that countries that open up their trade typically end up with absolute losers
alongside winners (Stolper and Samuelson, 1941). This may make integration
more difficult, ex ante, or promote disintegration, ex post. Our experiment
reveals that the backlash may occur even if everyone is a potential winner in
absolute terms. The analysis suggests an additional angle that may help us
understand recent phenomena: inequality of opportunity across countries. In
the experiment, unequal economic prospects reduced individuals’ willingness
to cooperate with each other, thus acting as a friction in realizing the ben-
efits promised by integration. These results demonstrate the importance of
enhancing standard international economic theory to make explicit not only
the economic constraints, but also the human limitations that interfere with
the process of trade. Our experiment reveals that there is much to learn from
explicitly modeling the institutions and contractual solutions that are neces-
sary to attain the gains from economic integration—a perspective that echoes
the approach to studying globalization taken in a recent theoretical literature
(Antra`s and Costinot, 2010).
More concretely, the experiment provides three insights about factors that
influenced the emergence and success of economic integration in the lab, and
thus might similarly influence outcomes outside the lab. First, efficient trading
norms do not easily scale up because trust does not easily scale up. As a result,
integration is unlikely to generate the promised benefits—and, hence, to garner
much support from the public—in the absence of institutions that can facilitate
a trust-building process, and mitigate contractual enforcement frictions across
countries (Results 1-6). To the extent that expanding trade beyond local
boundaries requires a greater reliance on self-enforcing agreements, then these
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institutions are key to lower the incentives for short-sighted conduct.
Second, inequality of economic opportunity across countries might act as
a friction in realizing the gains promised by economic integration. In the
experiment, inequality had a negative effect on the performance of integrated
economies because it inhibited cooperation and harmed cohesion (Results 7-9).
Not only was the willingness to cooperate elastic to relative economic advan-
tages, but when potential gains were distributed iniquitously, those who chose
mixed groups more frequently sought to exclude others from their group—a
choice that condemned the excluded to low-payoff interactions.
Third, the backlash against integration can hardly be ascribed to a com-
munication failure of policymakers and economists, say, the potential benefits
were not made transparent to the public. Individual experience primarily
shaped subjects’ actions and attitudes toward integration in our experiment,
not so much the potential gain. In fact, when we boosted economic prospects
across the board and clearly communicated this to subjects, this failed to im-
prove outcomes (Results 10). We do see a lower desire to seek autarky (Result
11), but this is primarily due to larger realized earnings in mixed groups. Once
this factor is accounted for, the boost in potential gains improved attitudes
toward integration, but is of second order.16
Supposing that these laboratory results reflect a principle of behavior that
also underlies external decision processes, what policy considerations can we
make given the current disintegration tendencies?
First, policymakers should focus on strengthening formal institutions that
foster mutual trust by enhancing transparency, and discourage countries from
seeking purely immediate benefits by providing effective sanctions for short-
16This may help explain why Britons voted for Brexit even if, as noted in Sampson (2017, p.
164) “[L]eaving the EU is not in the economic interest of most of the left-behind voters.”
37
sighted, uncooperative conduct. This and other experiments reveal that over-
coming opportunistic temptations is inherently difficult if the contractual en-
vironment is weak—even if long-run cooperation can be highly profitable for
all parties involved. This may explain why keeping together potentially very
profitable economic unions and multilateral trade systems seems so challeng-
ing. The institutional requirements established by the EU for new members,
and the WTO’s sanctioning of uncooperative members may be ways to address
these challenges and thus should be strengthened rather than weakened.
Second, it has been argued that standard models of trade in goods and ser-
vices may underestimate the gains from trade by not taking into account the
dynamics of innovation in integrated markets. If so, the experiment suggests
that it may not matter if this determination is made transparent to policy-
makers and practitioners, but not to the public, because the mere prospect
of larger gains did not seem to drive choices in the experiment. Individual
experience is what mattered most.
Third, there is scope for cross-country redistributive policies, such as the
“cohesion” policies in the EU, to foster a spirit of cohesion among member
countries. Typically, countries with a high per-capita income are net contrib-
utors, so that stronger countries transfer some of their gains from integration
to weaker countries. This is similar to our No-Gap treatment, where top-to-
bottom redistribution improved the overall desire to scale up groups all the
way to 24 players. It also boosted overall cooperativeness and profits relative
to the opposite scenario (Wide-Gap treatment) in which integration was benefi-
cial for all but disproportionately so for those who were already well-off. This
is a new angle to explain the voting behavior of individuals—such as those
voting for Brexit—who in principle would gain from integration but might feel
left behind in relative terms.
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This last aspect is especially important if we think of the benefits from
integration in the experiment as embedding also a “political” component. If
so, the loss in political sovereignty that is generally associated with economic
integration might have greatly reduced the perceived benefits in some countries
but not others, due to different cultural views. This may also contribute to
explain the disintegration trends the world has been witnessing.
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A Appendix
A.1 Experimental procedures
The experiment was conducted at the Economic Science Institute’s laboratory
at Chapman University and involved 768 undergraduates recruited between
2/2017 and 03/2019. We ran 8 sessions per treatment, each with 24 partic-
ipants none of whom had previous experience with this game. Treatments
have variation in self-reported sex composition between 41 and 49 percent
males (average is 44%). On average, participants were paid USD 32, includ-
ing a show-up fee of USD 7 and the payoff from an incentivized quiz on the
instructions that was taken before the start of the experiment. The average
duration of a session was 1 hour and 40 minutes. Instructions were recorded
in advance and played aloud at the beginning of a session, participants had
the possibility to follow on individual copies. We used neutral language for
the instructions (words like “cooperation” or “help” were never used). The
instructions informed players that only one of the five supergames completed
would be randomly selected for payment, with public random draw at the end
of the experiment. The points earned in that supergame were converted into
dollars according to a pre-announced conversion rate of USD 0.18. The exper-
iment was programmed using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). No eye
contact was possible between participants. We collected demographic data in
an anonymous survey at the end of each session.
A.2 Proof of proposition 1
Here we prove that full cooperation is a sequential equilibrium in every group
and treatment. We say that a norm of cooperation is being followed in the
group whenever all players adopt the trigger strategy discussed in Section 4.
For convenience let the defection payoffs be, respectively, d and d − l to a
producer and a consumer. Let ki := 9 + 2i denote the cooperation payoff to a
consumer of type i = 1, 2, 3 under fixed pairs. Given this notation, a necessary
and sufficient condition for full cooperation to be an equilibrium is reported
in the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Fix an economy. Let ki+a = 11+a denote the smallest cooperation
payoff in that group. If the continuation probability
β ≥ β∗ := d
a+ k − d+ l ∈ (0, 1),
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then full cooperation is a sequential equilibrium.
Study the payoff to a type i player, who alternates between producer and
consumer roles, having the opportunity to earn ki + a every other round,
in a cooperative equilibrium. Let s = 0, 1 denote the role of the player at
the start of a round, where 0 is for a producer and 1 for a consumer. The
type of counterparts does not affect the player’s payoff—only the counterparts’
cooperation rate. In mixed groups, producers cannot discriminate based on
the consumer’s type as this information is not observed. Hence, in cooperative
equilibrium the player nets
v0 :=
β(a+ ki)
1− β2 and v1 :=
a+ ki
1− β2 ,
while off-equilibrium there is full defection so the payoff corresponds to the
one associated to infinite repetition of the static Nash equilibrium, denoted
vˆ0 :=
d+ β(d− l)
1− β2 and vˆ1 :=
d− l + βd
1− β2 .
Note that full defection payoffs are type invariant. It is immediate that off-
equilibrium a producer has no incentive to deviate from the sanctioning rule,
because defecting is the unique best response to every other producer defecting
in every round. Hence, we only need to show that v0 ≥ vˆ0, i.e., in equilibrium
the player has no incentive to defect as a producer, by refusing to help some
consumer.17 This inequality can be rearranged as β ≥ β∗i := 6/(6+2i+a1mixed)
for the case of fixed pairs and mixed groups and the Lemma automatically
follows. Note that β∗i < 1 because a+ ki − (2d− l) > 0 by assumption for all
player types. The Lemma exploits the fact that the lowerbound probability
β consistent with cooperation is a decreasing function of the player’s return
from cooperation a + ki. Hence β∗i decreases in i, so that players of higher
type, who have higher returns from cooperation in the group, also have a
greater incentive to cooperate. Proposition 1 follows from observing that in
the experiment β = 0.75 and the most stringent requirement comes from fixed
pairs composed of type 1 players, in which case a = 0 and k1 = 11, so β∗1 = 0.75
represents the smallest lowerbound threshold.
17Though in the experiment discounting starts on round T = 18, the round in which the
random termination rule started, one can demonstrates that the incentives to cooperate
monotonically decline until round t. It follows that by studying the incentives to cooper-
ate in equilibrium using payoffs associated with the beginning of round T ensures those
incentives are satisfied in all t < T . In period t = T payoffs correspond to vs above. The
details of this demonstration are provided in Bigoni et al. (2019).
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